domingo, 8 de febrero de 2009
CRISIS: LO PEOR ESTÁ POR VENIR
Analisis del ultimo numero de la revista Foreign Policy en Español, por 5 destacados economistas.
Fannie Mae’s Last Stand
Crónica sobre el descalabro de Fannie Mae, publicada en Vanity Fair por Bethanu McLean, autora del mejor libro sobre el Caso Enron, llamado "The Smartests guys in the room", y proxima a publicar a mediados de años un libro sobre la crisis mundial.
Un gestor de fondos avisó durante años a los supervisores del fraude de Madoff
Harry Markopolos alerto a la SEC sobre el fraude Madoff, durante años pero nadie le hizo caso, como publica El Pais de hoy
sábado, 17 de enero de 2009
The Crash: What Went Wrong?
El Washington Post ha publicado una serie de artículos sobre el Origen de la Crisis Financiera actual.The Crash: What Went Wrong?
How did the most dynamic and sophisticated financial markets in the world come to the brink of collapse? The Washington Post examines how Wall Street innovation outpaced Washington regulation.
How did the most dynamic and sophisticated financial markets in the world come to the brink of collapse? The Washington Post examines how Wall Street innovation outpaced Washington regulation.
miércoles, 7 de enero de 2009
The End of the Financial World as We Know It
Michael Lewis el autor de Liar's Poker junto a David Einhorn ha escrito una serie de 2 artículos en el NYT: el primero llamado "The End of the Financial World as We Know It" detalla cómo el sistema financiero ha cambiado por completo con la crisis subprime aunado al escandalo Madoff y el segundo explica qué soluciones se podrían tomar, How to Repair a Broken Financial World
The End of the Financial World as We Know It
By MICHAEL LEWIS and DAVID EINHORN
AMERICANS enter the New Year in a strange new role: financial lunatics. We’ve been viewed by the wider world with mistrust and suspicion on other matters, but on the subject of money even our harshest critics have been inclined to believe that we knew what we were doing. They watched our investment bankers and emulated them: for a long time now half the planet’s college graduates seemed to want nothing more out of life than a job on Wall Street.
This is one reason the collapse of our financial system has inspired not merely a national but a global crisis of confidence. Good God, the world seems to be saying, if they don’t know what they are doing with money, who does?
Incredibly, intelligent people the world over remain willing to lend us money and even listen to our advice; they appear not to have realized the full extent of our madness. We have at least a brief chance to cure ourselves. But first we need to ask: of what?
To that end consider the strange story of Harry Markopolos. Mr. Markopolos is the former investment officer with Rampart Investment Management in Boston who, for nine years, tried to explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernard L. Madoff couldn’t be anything other than a fraud. Mr. Madoff’s investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely improbable but mathematically impossible. And so, Mr. Markopolos reasoned, Bernard Madoff must be doing something other than what he said he was doing.
In his devastatingly persuasive 17-page letter to the S.E.C., Mr. Markopolos saw two possible scenarios. In the “Unlikely” scenario: Mr. Madoff, who acted as a broker as well as an investor, was “front-running” his brokerage customers. A customer might submit an order to Madoff Securities to buy shares in I.B.M. at a certain price, for example, and Madoff Securities instantly would buy I.B.M. shares for its own portfolio ahead of the customer order. If I.B.M.’s shares rose, Mr. Madoff kept them; if they fell he fobbed them off onto the poor customer.
In the “Highly Likely” scenario, wrote Mr. Markopolos, “Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” Which, as we now know, it was. ............
The End of the Financial World as We Know It
By MICHAEL LEWIS and DAVID EINHORN
AMERICANS enter the New Year in a strange new role: financial lunatics. We’ve been viewed by the wider world with mistrust and suspicion on other matters, but on the subject of money even our harshest critics have been inclined to believe that we knew what we were doing. They watched our investment bankers and emulated them: for a long time now half the planet’s college graduates seemed to want nothing more out of life than a job on Wall Street.
This is one reason the collapse of our financial system has inspired not merely a national but a global crisis of confidence. Good God, the world seems to be saying, if they don’t know what they are doing with money, who does?
Incredibly, intelligent people the world over remain willing to lend us money and even listen to our advice; they appear not to have realized the full extent of our madness. We have at least a brief chance to cure ourselves. But first we need to ask: of what?
To that end consider the strange story of Harry Markopolos. Mr. Markopolos is the former investment officer with Rampart Investment Management in Boston who, for nine years, tried to explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernard L. Madoff couldn’t be anything other than a fraud. Mr. Madoff’s investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely improbable but mathematically impossible. And so, Mr. Markopolos reasoned, Bernard Madoff must be doing something other than what he said he was doing.
In his devastatingly persuasive 17-page letter to the S.E.C., Mr. Markopolos saw two possible scenarios. In the “Unlikely” scenario: Mr. Madoff, who acted as a broker as well as an investor, was “front-running” his brokerage customers. A customer might submit an order to Madoff Securities to buy shares in I.B.M. at a certain price, for example, and Madoff Securities instantly would buy I.B.M. shares for its own portfolio ahead of the customer order. If I.B.M.’s shares rose, Mr. Madoff kept them; if they fell he fobbed them off onto the poor customer.
In the “Highly Likely” scenario, wrote Mr. Markopolos, “Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” Which, as we now know, it was. ............
miércoles, 31 de diciembre de 2008
Anatomia del Pánico en Morgan Stanley
En este articulo se detalla como en plena crisis financiera de la tercera semana de setiembre, luego de la quiebra del Lehman Brothers, la siguiente victima aparentemente era el Morgan Stanley, y muestra como una serie de rumores presumiblemente originados por bancos competidores casi derrumban a esta institución
Anatomy of the Morgan Stanley Panic
Two days after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sought bankruptcy protection, an explosive rumor spread that another big Wall Street firm, Morgan Stanley, was on the brink of failure. The chatter on trading desks that Sept. 17 was that Deutsche Bank AG had yanked a billion credit line to the firm.
That wasn't true, but it helped trigger a cascade of bearish bets against Morgan Stanley. Chief Executive Officer John Mack complained bitterly that profit-hungry traders were sowing panic. Yet he lacked a critical piece of information: Who exactly was behind those damaging trades?
Anatomy of the Morgan Stanley Panic
Two days after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sought bankruptcy protection, an explosive rumor spread that another big Wall Street firm, Morgan Stanley, was on the brink of failure. The chatter on trading desks that Sept. 17 was that Deutsche Bank AG had yanked a billion credit line to the firm.
That wasn't true, but it helped trigger a cascade of bearish bets against Morgan Stanley. Chief Executive Officer John Mack complained bitterly that profit-hungry traders were sowing panic. Yet he lacked a critical piece of information: Who exactly was behind those damaging trades?
DERIVADOS - DERIVATIVES
Para entender mejor la crisis, se debe entender primero como funcionan los Derivados, y nada como esta fascinante descripción de John Lachester, Cityphilia publicada en el London Review of Books, sobre como funcionan los Swaps, las Opciones y los CDOs (Collateralised Debt Obligations) estructuradas en base a creditos hipotecarios subprime.
Como muy bien dijo Warren Buffet 5 años atras:
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
Como muy bien dijo Warren Buffet 5 años atras:
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
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