En este articulo se detalla como en plena crisis financiera de la tercera semana de setiembre, luego de la quiebra del Lehman Brothers, la siguiente victima aparentemente era el Morgan Stanley, y muestra como una serie de rumores presumiblemente originados por bancos competidores casi derrumban a esta institución
Anatomy of the Morgan Stanley Panic
Two days after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sought bankruptcy protection, an explosive rumor spread that another big Wall Street firm, Morgan Stanley, was on the brink of failure. The chatter on trading desks that Sept. 17 was that Deutsche Bank AG had yanked a billion credit line to the firm.
That wasn't true, but it helped trigger a cascade of bearish bets against Morgan Stanley. Chief Executive Officer John Mack complained bitterly that profit-hungry traders were sowing panic. Yet he lacked a critical piece of information: Who exactly was behind those damaging trades?
miércoles, 31 de diciembre de 2008
DERIVADOS - DERIVATIVES
Para entender mejor la crisis, se debe entender primero como funcionan los Derivados, y nada como esta fascinante descripción de John Lachester, Cityphilia publicada en el London Review of Books, sobre como funcionan los Swaps, las Opciones y los CDOs (Collateralised Debt Obligations) estructuradas en base a creditos hipotecarios subprime.
Como muy bien dijo Warren Buffet 5 años atras:
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
Como muy bien dijo Warren Buffet 5 años atras:
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
lunes, 29 de diciembre de 2008
The weekend that Wall Street died - El fin de semana que Wall Street murió
Crónica del segundo fin de semana de setiembre del año que acaba, en que se detalla cómo se fue a la quiebra el Lehman Brothers.
The weekend that Wall Street died
With his investment bank facing a near-certain failure, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s chief executive officer, Richard Fuld Jr., placed yet another phone call to the man he thought could save him.
Fuld was already effectively out of options by the afternoon of Sunday, Sept. 14. The U.S. government said it wouldn't fund a bailout for Lehman, the country's oldest investment bank. Britain's Barclays PLC had agreed in principle to buy the loss-wracked firm, but the deal fell apart. Bank of America Corp., initially seen as Lehman's most likely buyer, had said two days earlier that it couldn't do a deal without federal aid -- and by Sunday was deep in secret negotiations to take over Lehman rival Merrill Lynch & Co.
Desperate to avoid steering his 25,000-person company into bankruptcy proceedings, Fuld dialed the Charlotte, N.C., home of Bank of America Chairman Kenneth D. Lewis. His calls so far that weekend had gone unreturned. This time, Lewis's wife, Donna, again picked up, and told the boss of Lehman Brothers: If Lewis wanted to call back, he would call back.
Fuld paused, then apologized for bothering her. "I am so sorry," he said.
.
His lament could also have been for the investment-banking model that had come to embody the words "Wall Street." Within hours of his call, Lehman announced it would file for bankruptcy protection. Within a week, Wall Street as it was known -- loosely regulated, daringly risky and lavishly rewarded -- was dead.
As Fuld waged his increasingly desperate bid to save his firm that weekend, the bosses of Wall Street's other three giant investment banks were locked in their own battles as their firms came under mounting pressure. It was a weekend unlike anything Wall Street had ever seen: In past crises, its bosses had banded together to save their way of life. This time, the financial hole they had dug for themselves was too deep. It was every man for himself, and Fuld, who declined to comment for this article, was the odd man out.
For the U.S. securities industry to unravel as spectacularly as it did in September, many parties had to pull on many threads. Mortgage bankers gave loans to Americans for homes they couldn't afford. Investment houses packaged these loans into complex instruments whose risk they didn't always understand. Ratings agencies often gave their seal of approval, investors borrowed heavily to buy, regulators missed the warning signs. But at the center of it all -- and paid hundreds of millions of dollars during the boom to manage their firms' risk -- were the four bosses of Wall Street.
Details of these CEOs' decisions and negotiations, many of them previously unreported, show how they sought to avert the death of America's giant investment banks. Their efforts culminated in a round-the-clock weekend of secret negotiations and personal struggles to keep their firms afloat. Accounts of these events are based on company and other documents, emails and interviews with Wall Street executives, traders, regulators, investors and others........
The weekend that Wall Street died
With his investment bank facing a near-certain failure, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s chief executive officer, Richard Fuld Jr., placed yet another phone call to the man he thought could save him.
Fuld was already effectively out of options by the afternoon of Sunday, Sept. 14. The U.S. government said it wouldn't fund a bailout for Lehman, the country's oldest investment bank. Britain's Barclays PLC had agreed in principle to buy the loss-wracked firm, but the deal fell apart. Bank of America Corp., initially seen as Lehman's most likely buyer, had said two days earlier that it couldn't do a deal without federal aid -- and by Sunday was deep in secret negotiations to take over Lehman rival Merrill Lynch & Co.
Desperate to avoid steering his 25,000-person company into bankruptcy proceedings, Fuld dialed the Charlotte, N.C., home of Bank of America Chairman Kenneth D. Lewis. His calls so far that weekend had gone unreturned. This time, Lewis's wife, Donna, again picked up, and told the boss of Lehman Brothers: If Lewis wanted to call back, he would call back.
Fuld paused, then apologized for bothering her. "I am so sorry," he said.
.
His lament could also have been for the investment-banking model that had come to embody the words "Wall Street." Within hours of his call, Lehman announced it would file for bankruptcy protection. Within a week, Wall Street as it was known -- loosely regulated, daringly risky and lavishly rewarded -- was dead.
As Fuld waged his increasingly desperate bid to save his firm that weekend, the bosses of Wall Street's other three giant investment banks were locked in their own battles as their firms came under mounting pressure. It was a weekend unlike anything Wall Street had ever seen: In past crises, its bosses had banded together to save their way of life. This time, the financial hole they had dug for themselves was too deep. It was every man for himself, and Fuld, who declined to comment for this article, was the odd man out.
For the U.S. securities industry to unravel as spectacularly as it did in September, many parties had to pull on many threads. Mortgage bankers gave loans to Americans for homes they couldn't afford. Investment houses packaged these loans into complex instruments whose risk they didn't always understand. Ratings agencies often gave their seal of approval, investors borrowed heavily to buy, regulators missed the warning signs. But at the center of it all -- and paid hundreds of millions of dollars during the boom to manage their firms' risk -- were the four bosses of Wall Street.
Details of these CEOs' decisions and negotiations, many of them previously unreported, show how they sought to avert the death of America's giant investment banks. Their efforts culminated in a round-the-clock weekend of secret negotiations and personal struggles to keep their firms afloat. Accounts of these events are based on company and other documents, emails and interviews with Wall Street executives, traders, regulators, investors and others........
domingo, 28 de diciembre de 2008
El Wa Mu siempre decía SI
El último artículo sobre la Crisis Financiera actual publicado por el NYT de la Serie The Reckoning (Artículos sobre las causas de la crisis) demuestra cómo el Washington Mutual se comportaba mas como una Fábrica de Hipotecas que como una institución financiera seria.
Por ejemplo hace cuatro años un cliente al solicitar un préstamo hipotecario, señalaba que tenia ingresos anuales de seis dígitos en base a su profesión de mariachi.
Como el banco no podia verificar sus ingresos , simplemente le tomaron una foto vestido de marichi al frente de su casa que fue enviada al file del cliente en el Wa Mu, resultado Crédito Aprobado.
Historias como estas existen miles, y estos Créditos Subprime son los que luego se empaquetaron en los CDOs por miles de millones de dólares con Ratings AAA y que luego han desencadenado la crísis que hoy vivimos.
The Reckoning
Por ejemplo hace cuatro años un cliente al solicitar un préstamo hipotecario, señalaba que tenia ingresos anuales de seis dígitos en base a su profesión de mariachi.
Como el banco no podia verificar sus ingresos , simplemente le tomaron una foto vestido de marichi al frente de su casa que fue enviada al file del cliente en el Wa Mu, resultado Crédito Aprobado.
Historias como estas existen miles, y estos Créditos Subprime son los que luego se empaquetaron en los CDOs por miles de millones de dólares con Ratings AAA y que luego han desencadenado la crísis que hoy vivimos.
Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans
“We hope to do to this industry what Wal-Mart did to theirs, Starbucks did to theirs, Costco did to theirs and Lowe’s-Home Depot did to their industry. And I think if we’ve done our job, five years from now you’re not going to call us a bank.”
— Kerry K. Killinger, chief executive of Washington Mutual, 2003
SAN DIEGO — As a supervisor at a Washington Mutual mortgage processing center, John D. Parsons was accustomed to seeing baby sitters claiming salaries worthy of college presidents, and schoolteachers with incomes rivaling stockbrokers’. He rarely questioned them. A real estate frenzy was under way and WaMu, as his bank was known, was all about saying yes.
Yet even by WaMu’s relaxed standards, one mortgage four years ago raised eyebrows. The borrower was claiming a six-figure income and an unusual profession: mariachi singer.
Mr. Parsons could not verify the singer’s income, so he had him photographed in front of his home dressed in his mariachi outfit. The photo went into a WaMu file. Approved.domingo, 21 de diciembre de 2008
La Evolución de Hank Paulson
Serie de 2 articulos por el Washington Post sobre el Secretario del Tesoro Hanry Paulson
El primero detalla los inicios de Hanry Paulson
Washington Broker The Evolution of Hank Paulson
A Conversion in 'This Storm'
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. had a stern message for more than two dozen of the nation's most powerful hedge fund managers gathered in the third-floor conference room near his office.
El Segundo es la crónica de cómo Hank Paulson ha manejado la crisis actual.
A Skeptical Outsider Becomes Bush's 'Wartime General'
The pressure on Henry M. Paulson Jr. in early September was greater than at any other time during his tenure as Treasury secretary. As he pored over the books of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, he discovered that they were about to collapse and that the financial markets would experience what he called "a meltdown to end all meltdowns."
El primero detalla los inicios de Hanry Paulson
Washington Broker The Evolution of Hank Paulson
A Conversion in 'This Storm'
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. had a stern message for more than two dozen of the nation's most powerful hedge fund managers gathered in the third-floor conference room near his office.
El Segundo es la crónica de cómo Hank Paulson ha manejado la crisis actual.
A Skeptical Outsider Becomes Bush's 'Wartime General'
The pressure on Henry M. Paulson Jr. in early September was greater than at any other time during his tenure as Treasury secretary. As he pored over the books of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, he discovered that they were about to collapse and that the financial markets would experience what he called "a meltdown to end all meltdowns."
América latina registrará en 2009 el menor crecimiento en seis años
El suplemento iECO del Clarin de Argentina nos señala el Balance Preliminar de America Latina en el 2008 y perspectivas para el 2009.
América latina registrará en 2009 el menor crecimiento en seis años
Lo dice un informe de la CEPAL. Asegura que la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
El crecimiento económico de América Latina y el Caribe caerá el próximo año a un 1,9 por ciento, como consecuencia de la crisis internacional. Al menos eso sostiene un informe de la CEPAL presentado hoy en Santiago de Chile. Será la tasa de crecimiento más baja en los últimos seis años.
En el Balance Preliminar de las economías de América latina y el Caribe 2008, la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) destacó no obstante que 2008 mejoraron también los indicadores del mercado del trabajo y disminuyó la pobreza.
En un contexto favorable, casi todos los países dieron prioridad a los equilibrios macroeconómicos y generaron superávit en sus cuentas externas y fiscales, destacó al presentar el documento la secretaria ejecutiva de la CEPAL, Alicia Bárcena.
Así, la funcionaria indicó que hoy la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
Sobre esa base, además de disminuir el crecimiento del Producto Interior Bruto (PIB) en la región, se prevé para el próximo año un aumento del desempleo desde una tasa del 7,8 por ciento este año hasta un rango de entre 7,8 y 8,1 por ciento en 2009.
A nivel de países, este año el crecimiento ha sido liderado por Uruguay (11,5%), Perú (9,4%), Panamá (9,2%), los tres a considerable distancia de Argentina, que sigue en la lista con una expansión del 6,8% y de Ecuador, con un 6,5%.
Brasil creció este año un 5,9 por ciento, una décima más que Bolivia (5,8%), en tanto que a continuación están Paraguay (5,0%), Venezuela (4,8%), República Dominicana (4,5%), Cuba (4,3%), Chile (3,8%) y Honduras (3,8%).
El crecimiento de Costa Rica llegó al 3,3%, mientras Colombia alcanzó un 3,0%, lo mismo que El Salvador y Nicaragua. En los últimos lugares de la lista están México (1,8%) y Haití (1,5%)
América latina registrará en 2009 el menor crecimiento en seis años
Lo dice un informe de la CEPAL. Asegura que la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
El crecimiento económico de América Latina y el Caribe caerá el próximo año a un 1,9 por ciento, como consecuencia de la crisis internacional. Al menos eso sostiene un informe de la CEPAL presentado hoy en Santiago de Chile. Será la tasa de crecimiento más baja en los últimos seis años.
En el Balance Preliminar de las economías de América latina y el Caribe 2008, la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) destacó no obstante que 2008 mejoraron también los indicadores del mercado del trabajo y disminuyó la pobreza.
En un contexto favorable, casi todos los países dieron prioridad a los equilibrios macroeconómicos y generaron superávit en sus cuentas externas y fiscales, destacó al presentar el documento la secretaria ejecutiva de la CEPAL, Alicia Bárcena.
Así, la funcionaria indicó que hoy la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
Sobre esa base, además de disminuir el crecimiento del Producto Interior Bruto (PIB) en la región, se prevé para el próximo año un aumento del desempleo desde una tasa del 7,8 por ciento este año hasta un rango de entre 7,8 y 8,1 por ciento en 2009.
A nivel de países, este año el crecimiento ha sido liderado por Uruguay (11,5%), Perú (9,4%), Panamá (9,2%), los tres a considerable distancia de Argentina, que sigue en la lista con una expansión del 6,8% y de Ecuador, con un 6,5%.
Brasil creció este año un 5,9 por ciento, una décima más que Bolivia (5,8%), en tanto que a continuación están Paraguay (5,0%), Venezuela (4,8%), República Dominicana (4,5%), Cuba (4,3%), Chile (3,8%) y Honduras (3,8%).
El crecimiento de Costa Rica llegó al 3,3%, mientras Colombia alcanzó un 3,0%, lo mismo que El Salvador y Nicaragua. En los últimos lugares de la lista están México (1,8%) y Haití (1,5%)
Madoff: El hombre que estafo al universo
El enorme fraude de Bernard Madoff tiene una explicación: su habilidad, el exceso de confianza de sus millonarios clientes y el pésimo control de los reguladores .
Hace diez días el agente del FBI Theodore Cacioppi llamó a un apartamento de Manhattan. Sabía que la persona que estaba al otro lado de la puerta no sólo era el hombre que modernizó la Bolsa de Nueva York y consiguió que los intermediarios cambiaran el teléfono por el ordenador, con lo que las operaciones empezaron a cerrarse en segundos en vez de minutos y se podía ganar más dinero en menos tiempo.
No sólo había sido el presidente del Nasdaq, el mercado electrónico de acciones de EE UU. Ahora era el director de una empresa que se dedicaba a la intermediación bursátil y de otra, Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, que asesoraba a grandes inversores particulares y a gestoras de fondos. Su empresa ostentaba el récord de haber pagado beneficios superiores al 8% anual durante 72 meses consecutivos.
Hace diez días el agente del FBI Theodore Cacioppi llamó a un apartamento de Manhattan. Sabía que la persona que estaba al otro lado de la puerta no sólo era el hombre que modernizó la Bolsa de Nueva York y consiguió que los intermediarios cambiaran el teléfono por el ordenador, con lo que las operaciones empezaron a cerrarse en segundos en vez de minutos y se podía ganar más dinero en menos tiempo.
No sólo había sido el presidente del Nasdaq, el mercado electrónico de acciones de EE UU. Ahora era el director de una empresa que se dedicaba a la intermediación bursátil y de otra, Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, que asesoraba a grandes inversores particulares y a gestoras de fondos. Su empresa ostentaba el récord de haber pagado beneficios superiores al 8% anual durante 72 meses consecutivos.
jueves, 18 de diciembre de 2008
Bernie Madoff gigantic Ponzi scheme
Increible hace 10 años una persona avisó a la SEC de que el Fondo de Madoff era un gigantesco Ponzi Scheme (Piramide) y nadie le hizo caso
Busting Bernie Madoff: One Man's 10 Year Crusade
Henry Blodget Dec 17, 08 9:38 PM
The Wall Street Journal has published a detailed account of private fraud investigator Harry Markopolos's efforts over the past 10 years to persuade the SEC that Bernie Madoff was running a gigantic Ponzi scheme (or, at best, was front-running).
Markopolos submitted extensive analysis to the SEC in 2005, which we've embedded below. The SEC did conduct an investigation thereafter, in the course of which Bernie Madoff "mislead" them about the nature of some of his dealings with his primary fund-of-funds promoter Fairfield Greenwich Group.
Busting Bernie Madoff: One Man's 10 Year Crusade
Henry Blodget Dec 17, 08 9:38 PM
The Wall Street Journal has published a detailed account of private fraud investigator Harry Markopolos's efforts over the past 10 years to persuade the SEC that Bernie Madoff was running a gigantic Ponzi scheme (or, at best, was front-running).
Markopolos submitted extensive analysis to the SEC in 2005, which we've embedded below. The SEC did conduct an investigation thereafter, in the course of which Bernie Madoff "mislead" them about the nature of some of his dealings with his primary fund-of-funds promoter Fairfield Greenwich Group.
Madoff Exploited the Jews
Una explicación de como en base a la confianza de un mismo grupo religioso, etnico o de una comunidad, se realizan las mayores estafas y ante esto no existe ley que valga.
Me consta a mi suegro que es Testigo de Jehova, lo han estafado varias veces los mismos "hermanitos" testigos.
Madoff Exploited the Jews
By RONALD A. CASS
Steven Spielberg. Elie Wiesel. Mort Zuckerman. Frank Lautenberg. Yeshiva University. As I read the list of people and enterprises reportedly bilked to the tune of $50 billion by Bernard Madoff, I recalled a childhood in which my father received bad news by asking first, "Was it a Jew?" My father coupled sensitivity to anti-Semitism with special sympathy for other Jews. In contrast, Mr. Madoff, it seems, targeted other Jews, drawing them in at least in some measure because of a shared faith.
Me consta a mi suegro que es Testigo de Jehova, lo han estafado varias veces los mismos "hermanitos" testigos.
Madoff Exploited the Jews
By RONALD A. CASS
Steven Spielberg. Elie Wiesel. Mort Zuckerman. Frank Lautenberg. Yeshiva University. As I read the list of people and enterprises reportedly bilked to the tune of $50 billion by Bernard Madoff, I recalled a childhood in which my father received bad news by asking first, "Was it a Jew?" My father coupled sensitivity to anti-Semitism with special sympathy for other Jews. In contrast, Mr. Madoff, it seems, targeted other Jews, drawing them in at least in some measure because of a shared faith.
sábado, 13 de diciembre de 2008
La gran estafa de Madoff podría provocar pérdidas de 3.000 millones en la banca española
MADRID, 13 Dic. (OTR/PRESS) -
La estafa de Bernard L. Madoff podría tener un impacto multimillonario en España, ya que al menos 3.000 de los 50.000 millones de dólares defraudados podrían pertenecer a varios fondos de cobertura y boutiques de inversión españoles. Si finalmente se confirman las supuestas pérdidas millonarias, se convertiría en el segundo mayor fraude de la historia, sólo superado por los 63.400 millones de dólares que Enron tenía en activos cuando entró en bancarrota en 2001. A pesar de las noticias que aseguran que el fraude de Madoff habría afectado a entidades españolas, como el Santander o el BBVA. La entidad que preside Francisco González se apresuró a desmentir que haya comercializado productos vinculados a Madoff.
Los 3.000 millones de euros que supuestamente fueron estafados a la banca española podrían proceder de Optimal, la gestora de fondos de cobertura ('hedge funds') del Banco Santander, que habrían sido distribuidos por la red de banca privada del Santander, Banif, cuyos clientes se vieron sacudidos anteriormente por la quiebra de Lehman. No obstante, la entidad no se ha querido pronunciar al respecto.
Por otro lado, aunque en un primer momento se apuntó a que también el BBVA podría haberse visto afectado, el banco desmintió haber comercializado en su red de clientes minoristas o de banca privada en España productos gestionados o depositados en Madoff Investment Securities. Por lo tanto, de ser cierto esto, en principio solamente el Banco Santander se habría visto afectado, y las pérdidas ascenderían a miles de millones de euros.
El millonario fraude se descubrió después de que los hijos de Bernard L. Madoff denunciasen a la Policía que su padre les había confesado haber provocado una estafa mediante el método Ponzi. Es decir, que planeó un fraude piramidal de proporciones épicas a través de un fondo de cobertura. Cuando Madoff, de 70 años, fue detenido en su casa de Manhattan, declaró ante los agentes que "todo era una gran mentira" y que "básicamente, se trataba de un gigantesco plan Ponzi", según informaciones de la CNBC, recogidas por otr/press.
ESTAFA HISTÓRICA
La estafa de Madoff se convertiría en la mayor de la historia, seguida del caso Enron en 2001 cuando fueron estafados 63.400 millones de dólares, si se confirma que son 50.000 millones de dólares los que han sido estafados mediante un 'esquema Ponzi', que implica el pago de prometedores o anormalmente elevados rendimientos, que son obtenidos por la empresa que recaudó el dinero. Es decir, un sistema envolvente o piramidal, que paga la rentabilidad prometida con el dinero ingresado mediante la entrada de nuevos clientes.
El artífice de este fraude, Bernard L. Madoff, es ex presidente de Nasdaq y uno de los inversores más activos de los últimos 50 años. Fundó la Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, que tiene unos 17.100 millones de dólares en activos gestionados. A esto hay que añadir que al menos la mitad de sus clientes son 'hedge funds', es decir, fondos de cobertura, el instrumento financiero con el que se ha llevado a cabo la estafa que es uno de los más utilizados en el mercado bursátil.
La estafa de Bernard L. Madoff podría tener un impacto multimillonario en España, ya que al menos 3.000 de los 50.000 millones de dólares defraudados podrían pertenecer a varios fondos de cobertura y boutiques de inversión españoles. Si finalmente se confirman las supuestas pérdidas millonarias, se convertiría en el segundo mayor fraude de la historia, sólo superado por los 63.400 millones de dólares que Enron tenía en activos cuando entró en bancarrota en 2001. A pesar de las noticias que aseguran que el fraude de Madoff habría afectado a entidades españolas, como el Santander o el BBVA. La entidad que preside Francisco González se apresuró a desmentir que haya comercializado productos vinculados a Madoff.
Los 3.000 millones de euros que supuestamente fueron estafados a la banca española podrían proceder de Optimal, la gestora de fondos de cobertura ('hedge funds') del Banco Santander, que habrían sido distribuidos por la red de banca privada del Santander, Banif, cuyos clientes se vieron sacudidos anteriormente por la quiebra de Lehman. No obstante, la entidad no se ha querido pronunciar al respecto.
Por otro lado, aunque en un primer momento se apuntó a que también el BBVA podría haberse visto afectado, el banco desmintió haber comercializado en su red de clientes minoristas o de banca privada en España productos gestionados o depositados en Madoff Investment Securities. Por lo tanto, de ser cierto esto, en principio solamente el Banco Santander se habría visto afectado, y las pérdidas ascenderían a miles de millones de euros.
El millonario fraude se descubrió después de que los hijos de Bernard L. Madoff denunciasen a la Policía que su padre les había confesado haber provocado una estafa mediante el método Ponzi. Es decir, que planeó un fraude piramidal de proporciones épicas a través de un fondo de cobertura. Cuando Madoff, de 70 años, fue detenido en su casa de Manhattan, declaró ante los agentes que "todo era una gran mentira" y que "básicamente, se trataba de un gigantesco plan Ponzi", según informaciones de la CNBC, recogidas por otr/press.
ESTAFA HISTÓRICA
La estafa de Madoff se convertiría en la mayor de la historia, seguida del caso Enron en 2001 cuando fueron estafados 63.400 millones de dólares, si se confirma que son 50.000 millones de dólares los que han sido estafados mediante un 'esquema Ponzi', que implica el pago de prometedores o anormalmente elevados rendimientos, que son obtenidos por la empresa que recaudó el dinero. Es decir, un sistema envolvente o piramidal, que paga la rentabilidad prometida con el dinero ingresado mediante la entrada de nuevos clientes.
El artífice de este fraude, Bernard L. Madoff, es ex presidente de Nasdaq y uno de los inversores más activos de los últimos 50 años. Fundó la Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, que tiene unos 17.100 millones de dólares en activos gestionados. A esto hay que añadir que al menos la mitad de sus clientes son 'hedge funds', es decir, fondos de cobertura, el instrumento financiero con el que se ha llevado a cabo la estafa que es uno de los más utilizados en el mercado bursátil.
La Gran estafa de Madoff
El Wall Street Journal informa cómo ha sido la Gran Estafa de Madoff
Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud
Sons Turned In Madoff After He Allegedly Told Them His Investment-Advisory Business for
By AMIR EFRATI, TOM LAURICELLA and DIONNE SEARCEY
Bernard L. Madoff, a former chairman of the Nasdaq Stock Market and a force in Wall Street trading for nearly 50 years, was arrested by federal agents Thursday, a day after his sons turned him in for running what they said their father called "a giant Ponzi scheme."
Image from Madoff.com
Bernard Madoff
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in a civil complaint, said it was an ongoing $50 billion swindle, and asked a judge to seize the firm and its assets. "Our complaint alleges a stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions," said Andrew M. Calamari, associate director of enforcement in the SEC's New York office.
In a separate criminal complaint, Federal
Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud
Sons Turned In Madoff After He Allegedly Told Them His Investment-Advisory Business for
By AMIR EFRATI, TOM LAURICELLA and DIONNE SEARCEY
Bernard L. Madoff, a former chairman of the Nasdaq Stock Market and a force in Wall Street trading for nearly 50 years, was arrested by federal agents Thursday, a day after his sons turned him in for running what they said their father called "a giant Ponzi scheme."
Image from Madoff.com
Bernard Madoff
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in a civil complaint, said it was an ongoing $50 billion swindle, and asked a judge to seize the firm and its assets. "Our complaint alleges a stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions," said Andrew M. Calamari, associate director of enforcement in the SEC's New York office.
In a separate criminal complaint, Federal
jueves, 11 de diciembre de 2008
La Caida de Bear Stearns. The Fall of Bear Stearns
Crónica Definitiva sobre la "La Caida de Bear Stearns" por Kate Kelly publicado en el WSJ son 3 artículos. En el 2009 saldrá a la luz un libro sobre este tema por la misma autora llamado "Street Fighters: The Shocking Demise of Bear Stearns, the Toughest Firm on Wall Street" http://www.amazon.com/Street-Fighters-Shocking-Stearns-Toughest/dp/1591842735/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1229028115&sr=1-1
Part One: Missed Opportunities As the firm's fortunes spiraled downward, executives squabbled over raising capital and cutting its inventory of mortgages.
Part Two: Run on the Bank Executives believed they were about to turn a corner, but rumors and fear sent clients, trading partners and lenders fleeing.
Part Three: Deal or No Deal? The Fed pressured Bear Stearns to sell itself, but a misstep in the hastily drawn agreement nearly scuttled the deal.
Part One: Missed Opportunities As the firm's fortunes spiraled downward, executives squabbled over raising capital and cutting its inventory of mortgages.
Part Two: Run on the Bank Executives believed they were about to turn a corner, but rumors and fear sent clients, trading partners and lenders fleeing.
Part Three: Deal or No Deal? The Fed pressured Bear Stearns to sell itself, but a misstep in the hastily drawn agreement nearly scuttled the deal.
Wall Street se destruye otra vez
El gran historiador britanico Niall Ferguson, nos da una gran descripción de la crisis financiera actual, y de cómo modelos matemáticos importaron mas que el sentido comun
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/12/banks200812
Wall Street Lays Another Egg
Not so long ago, the dollar stood for a sum of gold, and bankers knew the people they lent to. The author charts the emergence of an abstract, even absurd world—call it Planet Finance—where mathematical models ignored both history and human nature, and value had no meaning.
This year we have lived through something more than a financial crisis. We have witnessed the death of a planet. Call it Planet Finance. Two years ago, in 2006, the measured economic output of the entire world was worth around $48.6 trillion. The total market capitalization of the world’s stock markets was $50.6 trillion, 4 percent larger. The total value of domestic and international bonds was $67.9 trillion, 40 percent larger. Planet Finance was beginning to dwarf Planet Earth........
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/12/banks200812
Wall Street Lays Another Egg
Not so long ago, the dollar stood for a sum of gold, and bankers knew the people they lent to. The author charts the emergence of an abstract, even absurd world—call it Planet Finance—where mathematical models ignored both history and human nature, and value had no meaning.
This year we have lived through something more than a financial crisis. We have witnessed the death of a planet. Call it Planet Finance. Two years ago, in 2006, the measured economic output of the entire world was worth around $48.6 trillion. The total market capitalization of the world’s stock markets was $50.6 trillion, 4 percent larger. The total value of domestic and international bonds was $67.9 trillion, 40 percent larger. Planet Finance was beginning to dwarf Planet Earth........
El Fin de Wall Street
Michael Lewis el autor de Liar's Poker, ha publicado este extraordinario artículo sobre la Crisis de Wall Street en la Revista Portfolio.
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom
Este artículo es citado por Thomas Friedman en el New York Times en el artículo," All Fall Down"http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/opinion/26friedman.html.
Friedman señaló "Also check out Michael Lewis’s superb essay, “The End of Wall Street’s Boom,” on Portfolio.com. Lewis, who first chronicled Wall Street’s excesses in “Liar’s Poker,” profiles some of the decent people on Wall Street who tried to expose the credit binge — including Meredith Whitney, a little known banking analyst who declared, over a year ago, that “Citigroup had so mismanaged its affairs that it would need to slash its dividend or go bust,” wrote Lewis. "
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom
Este artículo es citado por Thomas Friedman en el New York Times en el artículo," All Fall Down"http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/opinion/26friedman.html.
Friedman señaló "Also check out Michael Lewis’s superb essay, “The End of Wall Street’s Boom,” on Portfolio.com. Lewis, who first chronicled Wall Street’s excesses in “Liar’s Poker,” profiles some of the decent people on Wall Street who tried to expose the credit binge — including Meredith Whitney, a little known banking analyst who declared, over a year ago, that “Citigroup had so mismanaged its affairs that it would need to slash its dividend or go bust,” wrote Lewis. "
La Caida de Lehman
Aqui encontraran una descripción de la caida de Lehman Brothers y de su CEO Richard Fuld
Bleeding Green: The Fall of Fuld
Money, Respect and the Corner Office: What Lehman's 'Gorilla' CEO Has Lost
By ALICE GOMSTYN ABC NEWS Business UnitOct. 6, 2008
If you've ever heard of the tony estates of Greenwich, Conn., it probably wouldn't surprise you to learn that some come equipped with squash courts.
A decade ago, George Ball lived a mile and a half away from one of them. Ball was friends with the property's athletic owner and they played the game together -- one alpha male against another in a white box court.
Ball's squash partner was Richard Fuld, the chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers. Fuld, he said, wanted "very badly to win" but he also played fair.
Fuld is "the rare person who simultaneously wants to beat your brains in but also takes a good deal of joy in the things that his opponent does well," Ball said.
Off the court, Fuld, 62, probably isn't taking joy in much these days. Last month, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, marking the demise of one of Wall Street's most storied brokerage firms. Today, Fuld, who declined an ABCNews.com request for an interview, is scheduled to testify before Congress in a hearing on the financial crisis that continues to wreak havoc at other financial firms and the economy. (Read Fuld's prepared testimony.)
Lehman's bankruptcy thrust Fuld, who led the firm for 15 years and worked there for nearly 40, into the ever-growing club of CEOs who saw their investment banks felled by the subprime housing meltdown. On the day of Lehman's bankruptcy filing, Merrill Lynch announced it was selling itself to Bank of America. Months earlier, Bear Stearns was purchased by JPMorgan Chase with the government's backing. The week after Lehman's collapse, the country's last two major independent brokerage firms -- Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley -- sought to save themselves by morphing into commercial banks.
The bankruptcy filing distinguished Lehman from the fate of its brokerage brethren. Most of Lehman's North American operations were purchased by the U.K.-based Barclays Capital. But the debt holders of Lehman, unlike those of Bear Stearns and Merrill, were left with pennies on the dollar, said Sean Egan of the credit rating company Egan Jones.
And while shareholders of Bear Stearns saw the value of their stocks decimated, they still came out ahead of those who invested in Lehman, including many Lehman employees, who saw their holdings plummet to nothing. Fuld himself, according to InsiderScore.com, lost at least $600 million since December.
The face of Lehman's defeat, quite literally, was Fuld. On the day the bankruptcy filing was announced, artist Geoffrey Raymond -- known for painting Wall Street heavyweights and politicians -- debuted a large portrait of Fuld outside Lehman's Times Square headquarters. As he's done with other works, Raymond invited passersby, including Lehman employees, to use colored markers to sign messages on the canvas.
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=5951669&page=1
Bleeding Green: The Fall of Fuld
Money, Respect and the Corner Office: What Lehman's 'Gorilla' CEO Has Lost
By ALICE GOMSTYN ABC NEWS Business UnitOct. 6, 2008
If you've ever heard of the tony estates of Greenwich, Conn., it probably wouldn't surprise you to learn that some come equipped with squash courts.
A decade ago, George Ball lived a mile and a half away from one of them. Ball was friends with the property's athletic owner and they played the game together -- one alpha male against another in a white box court.
Ball's squash partner was Richard Fuld, the chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers. Fuld, he said, wanted "very badly to win" but he also played fair.
Fuld is "the rare person who simultaneously wants to beat your brains in but also takes a good deal of joy in the things that his opponent does well," Ball said.
Off the court, Fuld, 62, probably isn't taking joy in much these days. Last month, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, marking the demise of one of Wall Street's most storied brokerage firms. Today, Fuld, who declined an ABCNews.com request for an interview, is scheduled to testify before Congress in a hearing on the financial crisis that continues to wreak havoc at other financial firms and the economy. (Read Fuld's prepared testimony.)
Lehman's bankruptcy thrust Fuld, who led the firm for 15 years and worked there for nearly 40, into the ever-growing club of CEOs who saw their investment banks felled by the subprime housing meltdown. On the day of Lehman's bankruptcy filing, Merrill Lynch announced it was selling itself to Bank of America. Months earlier, Bear Stearns was purchased by JPMorgan Chase with the government's backing. The week after Lehman's collapse, the country's last two major independent brokerage firms -- Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley -- sought to save themselves by morphing into commercial banks.
The bankruptcy filing distinguished Lehman from the fate of its brokerage brethren. Most of Lehman's North American operations were purchased by the U.K.-based Barclays Capital. But the debt holders of Lehman, unlike those of Bear Stearns and Merrill, were left with pennies on the dollar, said Sean Egan of the credit rating company Egan Jones.
And while shareholders of Bear Stearns saw the value of their stocks decimated, they still came out ahead of those who invested in Lehman, including many Lehman employees, who saw their holdings plummet to nothing. Fuld himself, according to InsiderScore.com, lost at least $600 million since December.
The face of Lehman's defeat, quite literally, was Fuld. On the day the bankruptcy filing was announced, artist Geoffrey Raymond -- known for painting Wall Street heavyweights and politicians -- debuted a large portrait of Fuld outside Lehman's Times Square headquarters. As he's done with other works, Raymond invited passersby, including Lehman employees, to use colored markers to sign messages on the canvas.
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=5951669&page=1
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