lunes, 29 de diciembre de 2008

The weekend that Wall Street died - El fin de semana que Wall Street murió

Crónica del segundo fin de semana de setiembre del año que acaba, en que se detalla cómo se fue a la quiebra el Lehman Brothers.


The weekend that Wall Street died

With his investment bank facing a near-certain failure, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s chief executive officer, Richard Fuld Jr., placed yet another phone call to the man he thought could save him.
Fuld was already effectively out of options by the afternoon of Sunday, Sept. 14. The U.S. government said it wouldn't fund a bailout for Lehman, the country's oldest investment bank. Britain's Barclays PLC had agreed in principle to buy the loss-wracked firm, but the deal fell apart. Bank of America Corp., initially seen as Lehman's most likely buyer, had said two days earlier that it couldn't do a deal without federal aid -- and by Sunday was deep in secret negotiations to take over Lehman rival Merrill Lynch & Co.
Desperate to avoid steering his 25,000-person company into bankruptcy proceedings, Fuld dialed the Charlotte, N.C., home of Bank of America Chairman Kenneth D. Lewis. His calls so far that weekend had gone unreturned. This time, Lewis's wife, Donna, again picked up, and told the boss of Lehman Brothers: If Lewis wanted to call back, he would call back.
Fuld paused, then apologized for bothering her. "I am so sorry," he said.
.
His lament could also have been for the investment-banking model that had come to embody the words "Wall Street." Within hours of his call, Lehman announced it would file for bankruptcy protection. Within a week, Wall Street as it was known -- loosely regulated, daringly risky and lavishly rewarded -- was dead.
As Fuld waged his increasingly desperate bid to save his firm that weekend, the bosses of Wall Street's other three giant investment banks were locked in their own battles as their firms came under mounting pressure. It was a weekend unlike anything Wall Street had ever seen: In past crises, its bosses had banded together to save their way of life. This time, the financial hole they had dug for themselves was too deep. It was every man for himself, and Fuld, who declined to comment for this article, was the odd man out.
For the U.S. securities industry to unravel as spectacularly as it did in September, many parties had to pull on many threads. Mortgage bankers gave loans to Americans for homes they couldn't afford. Investment houses packaged these loans into complex instruments whose risk they didn't always understand. Ratings agencies often gave their seal of approval, investors borrowed heavily to buy, regulators missed the warning signs. But at the center of it all -- and paid hundreds of millions of dollars during the boom to manage their firms' risk -- were the four bosses of Wall Street.
Details of these CEOs' decisions and negotiations, many of them previously unreported, show how they sought to avert the death of America's giant investment banks. Their efforts culminated in a round-the-clock weekend of secret negotiations and personal struggles to keep their firms afloat. Accounts of these events are based on company and other documents, emails and interviews with Wall Street executives, traders, regulators, investors and others........

domingo, 28 de diciembre de 2008

El Wa Mu siempre decía SI

El último artículo sobre la Crisis Financiera actual publicado por el NYT de la Serie The Reckoning (Artículos sobre las causas de la crisis) demuestra cómo el Washington Mutual se comportaba mas como una Fábrica de Hipotecas que como una institución financiera seria.

Por ejemplo hace cuatro años un cliente al solicitar un préstamo hipotecario, señalaba que tenia ingresos anuales de seis dígitos en base a su profesión de mariachi.

Como el banco no podia verificar sus ingresos , simplemente le tomaron una foto vestido de marichi al frente de su casa que fue enviada al file del cliente en el Wa Mu, resultado Crédito Aprobado.

Historias como estas existen miles, y estos Créditos Subprime son los que luego se empaquetaron en los CDOs por miles de millones de dólares con Ratings AAA y que luego han desencadenado la crísis que hoy vivimos.

The Reckoning

Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans

“We hope to do to this industry what Wal-Mart did to theirs, Starbucks did to theirs, Costco did to theirs and Lowe’s-Home Depot did to their industry. And I think if we’ve done our job, five years from now you’re not going to call us a bank.”

— Kerry K. Killinger, chief executive of Washington Mutual, 2003

SAN DIEGO — As a supervisor at a Washington Mutual mortgage processing center, John D. Parsons was accustomed to seeing baby sitters claiming salaries worthy of college presidents, and schoolteachers with incomes rivaling stockbrokers’. He rarely questioned them. A real estate frenzy was under way and WaMu, as his bank was known, was all about saying yes.

Yet even by WaMu’s relaxed standards, one mortgage four years ago raised eyebrows. The borrower was claiming a six-figure income and an unusual profession: mariachi singer.

Mr. Parsons could not verify the singer’s income, so he had him photographed in front of his home dressed in his mariachi outfit. The photo went into a WaMu file. Approved.

domingo, 21 de diciembre de 2008

La Evolución de Hank Paulson

Serie de 2 articulos por el Washington Post sobre el Secretario del Tesoro Hanry Paulson


El primero detalla los inicios de Hanry Paulson
Washington Broker The Evolution of Hank Paulson
A Conversion in 'This Storm'

Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. had a stern message for more than two dozen of the nation's most powerful hedge fund managers gathered in the third-floor conference room near his office.

El Segundo es la crónica de cómo Hank Paulson ha manejado la crisis actual.
A Skeptical Outsider Becomes Bush's 'Wartime General'
The pressure on Henry M. Paulson Jr. in early September was greater than at any other time during his tenure as Treasury secretary. As he pored over the books of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, he discovered that they were about to collapse and that the financial markets would experience what he called "a meltdown to end all meltdowns."

América latina registrará en 2009 el menor crecimiento en seis años

El suplemento iECO del Clarin de Argentina nos señala el Balance Preliminar de America Latina en el 2008 y perspectivas para el 2009.



América latina registrará en 2009 el menor crecimiento en seis años
Lo dice un informe de la CEPAL. Asegura que la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
El crecimiento económico de América Latina y el Caribe caerá el próximo año a un 1,9 por ciento, como consecuencia de la crisis internacional. Al menos eso sostiene un informe de la CEPAL presentado hoy en Santiago de Chile. Será la tasa de crecimiento más baja en los últimos seis años.
En el Balance Preliminar de las economías de América latina y el Caribe 2008, la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) destacó no obstante que 2008 mejoraron también los indicadores del mercado del trabajo y disminuyó la pobreza.
En un contexto favorable, casi todos los países dieron prioridad a los equilibrios macroeconómicos y generaron superávit en sus cuentas externas y fiscales, destacó al presentar el documento la secretaria ejecutiva de la CEPAL, Alicia Bárcena.
Así, la funcionaria indicó que hoy la región está mejor preparada para enfrentar una crisis, pero en ningún caso es inmune.
Sobre esa base, además de disminuir el crecimiento del Producto Interior Bruto (PIB) en la región, se prevé para el próximo año un aumento del desempleo desde una tasa del 7,8 por ciento este año hasta un rango de entre 7,8 y 8,1 por ciento en 2009.
A nivel de países, este año el crecimiento ha sido liderado por Uruguay (11,5%), Perú (9,4%), Panamá (9,2%), los tres a considerable distancia de Argentina, que sigue en la lista con una expansión del 6,8% y de Ecuador, con un 6,5%.
Brasil creció este año un 5,9 por ciento, una décima más que Bolivia (5,8%), en tanto que a continuación están Paraguay (5,0%), Venezuela (4,8%), República Dominicana (4,5%), Cuba (4,3%), Chile (3,8%) y Honduras (3,8%).
El crecimiento de Costa Rica llegó al 3,3%, mientras Colombia alcanzó un 3,0%, lo mismo que El Salvador y Nicaragua. En los últimos lugares de la lista están México (1,8%) y Haití (1,5%)

Madoff: El hombre que estafo al universo

El enorme fraude de Bernard Madoff tiene una explicación: su habilidad, el exceso de confianza de sus millonarios clientes y el pésimo control de los reguladores .

Hace diez días el agente del FBI Theodore Cacioppi llamó a un apartamento de Manhattan. Sabía que la persona que estaba al otro lado de la puerta no sólo era el hombre que modernizó la Bolsa de Nueva York y consiguió que los intermediarios cambiaran el teléfono por el ordenador, con lo que las operaciones empezaron a cerrarse en segundos en vez de minutos y se podía ganar más dinero en menos tiempo.

No sólo había sido el presidente del Nasdaq, el mercado electrónico de acciones de EE UU. Ahora era el director de una empresa que se dedicaba a la intermediación bursátil y de otra, Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, que asesoraba a grandes inversores particulares y a gestoras de fondos. Su empresa ostentaba el récord de haber pagado beneficios superiores al 8% anual durante 72 meses consecutivos.

jueves, 18 de diciembre de 2008

Bernie Madoff gigantic Ponzi scheme

Increible hace 10 años una persona avisó a la SEC de que el Fondo de Madoff era un gigantesco Ponzi Scheme (Piramide) y nadie le hizo caso



Busting Bernie Madoff: One Man's 10 Year Crusade
Henry Blodget Dec 17, 08 9:38 PM
The Wall Street Journal has published a detailed account of private fraud investigator Harry Markopolos's efforts over the past 10 years to persuade the SEC that Bernie Madoff was running a gigantic Ponzi scheme (or, at best, was front-running).
Markopolos submitted extensive analysis to the SEC in 2005, which we've embedded below. The SEC did conduct an investigation thereafter, in the course of which Bernie Madoff "mislead" them about the nature of some of his dealings with his primary fund-of-funds promoter Fairfield Greenwich Group.

Madoff Exploited the Jews

Una explicación de como en base a la confianza de un mismo grupo religioso, etnico o de una comunidad, se realizan las mayores estafas y ante esto no existe ley que valga.



Me consta a mi suegro que es Testigo de Jehova, lo han estafado varias veces los mismos "hermanitos" testigos.



Madoff Exploited the Jews

By RONALD A. CASS
Steven Spielberg. Elie Wiesel. Mort Zuckerman. Frank Lautenberg. Yeshiva University. As I read the list of people and enterprises reportedly bilked to the tune of $50 billion by Bernard Madoff, I recalled a childhood in which my father received bad news by asking first, "Was it a Jew?" My father coupled sensitivity to anti-Semitism with special sympathy for other Jews. In contrast, Mr. Madoff, it seems, targeted other Jews, drawing them in at least in some measure because of a shared faith.